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Introduction
Many studies by renowned institutions such as the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED 1987) , the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Metz et al. 2007 ) the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD 2007) , the International Energy Agency (IEA 2008) , the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD 2009 ) and the World Bank (2010) have emphasized the key role of cities for future climate protection. Cities already account for around two thirds of global energy consumption and more than 70% of global energy-related carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) emissions, while on the other hand the potential for cost-efficient emission reductions is amongst the highest in buildings. In 2010, half of the world's population lived in cities and the number is expected to increase to reach 70% by 2050, thus also increasing the climate impact of cities. Hence, future climate policy has to target energy consumption in big cities as one major focus.
On the other hand, although there are small steps forward, global climate policy at the international level is in a deadlock. Neither the Copenhagen summit nor the follow-up meetings in Cancún and Durban were able to deliver a binding global climate policy regime with absolute emission targets and including all major emitting countries. Hence, bottom-up initiatives appear to become more important. One major strategy could be to globally interlink activities on the national, regional, or even local level. This strategy has been intensively discussed in the area of linking greenhouse gas emissions trading schemes (GHG ETS) (Flachsland et al. 2008 , Jaffe/Stavins 2008 , Mace et al. 2008 , Roßnagel 2008 , Sterk/Schüle 2009 . Apart from linking existing supranational (EU ETS), national (New Zealand, Australia ETS), and regional (Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, RGGI; Western Climate Initiative, WCI) ETS, linking megacity ETS could be a worthwhile strategy for promoting global climate protection, especially in countries and regions where national climate policy has failed so far. Initiatives for cooperation amongst cities already exist, e.g. under the C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group and could be utilized for linking megacity GHG ETS.
Also from the economic perspective on intergovernmental relations and environmental federalism (Oates 2004 ) local climate protection activities appear to be reasonable, since early arguments in favor of the centralization of responsibilities in environmental policies due to geographical externalities and the deregulation race (Stewart 1977) are currently turned down by the second generation of environmental federalism and empirical evidence. Morotomi (2012: 6ff) summarizes the economic arguments by emphasizing that municipalities could act as policy laboratories, while tailoring policies to the preferences of their residents and the particular infrastructural needs in order to increase welfare of local communities. This would also foster competition between municipalities and the "voting by feet" (Tiebout 1956 ), which in turn would increase citizens' utility from the provision of public goods. Apart from economics' arguments, also scientific studies in other fields emphasize the role of cities for global climate protection (Betsill/Bulkeley 2007) .
Emissions trading as an environmental policy instrument has already convincingly proven its effectiveness. While economic theory has been making the argument for the economic efficiency and ecological effectiveness of tradable permit systems since the late 1960s (Tietenberg 2006) , despite of some start-up problems, emissions trading systems such as the US SO 2 and NO X trading programs or the EU GHG ETS have even proven their merits in practice (Ellerman 2000 , Ellerman et al. 2010 ). It has also been shown, that in principle GHG ETS can be designed in such a way that they fulfill ambitious sustainability criteria (see Table 3 ) (Rudolph et al. 2012 ), hence, not only satisfying requirements for economic efficiency and ecological effectiveness (Boemare/Quirion 2002 , Fankhauser/Hepburn 2010 but also for social justice (Lerch 2011 ). However, obviously many political barriers exist for implementing sustainable GHG ETS, which are compulsory, have a comprehensive coverage, implement a stringent absolute volume cap and auction-off all allowance, while using the revenues for redistributive, mitigation, and adaptation measures (Rudolph 2009a, b; Rudolph/Park 2010) .
Tokyo, Japan's capital, is still the biggest metropolitan area in the world with a total population of around 13 Million; it also has the strongest metropolitan economy with a total Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of 868 billion US$ in 2007, thus representing 20% of Japan's GDP and ranking as the 15 th largest economy in the world (TMG 2010 , TMG 2012d . In environmental policy, Tokyo has been a leader for the Japanese national government in many fields such as vehicle emissions standards and even climate policy (Morotomi 2012 : 4, TMG 2006 Hence, with the city of Tokyo being a major economic and climate policy player in Japan and the world and local GHG ETS representing a promising bottom-up initiative for global climate protection, the following questions arise:
(1) What are the major design features of Tokyo's GHG ETS and how can they be judged?
(2) What are initial experiences with Tokyo's GHG ETS and how can they be evaluated?
(3) What are the major lessons for other city GHG ETS and potential intercity linkages?
This paper answers theses questions by applying design and implications analysis as well as sustainability and political economics' reasoning. This paper goes beyond earlier ex ante analysis of Tokyo's GHG ETS (Wakabayashi/Kimura/Nishio 2011), because, besides economic and ecological criteria, it also includes the social dimension, thus judging the design of Tokyo's carbon market based on ambitious sustainability criteria for emissions trading schemes (Rudolph et al. 2012 ). In addition, it makes use of the first actual performance data of the TMG In 2007 22% of CO 2 emissions originated from transportation, 27% from households and 49% from economic activities (TMG 2011a). The major part of emissions from economic activities originates from commercial activities (40%), while only 9% come from industrial productions.
Of the 49% emissions from economic activities, 40% originate from large facilities and 60% from small and medium-size facilities (TMG 2012d). Also, while emissions in industry have decreased since 1990, emissions in the commercial sector have increased.
In terms of energy type, electricity accounts for 50% of Tokyo's CO 2 emissions, followed by oil (28%) and city gas (17%). While emissions from city gas have grown rapidly by 43.5% between 1990 and 2006 due to the fuel switch from oil to gas, electricity emissions increased by 14.5%
and emissions from oil, LPG and others (incl. coal) decreased by more than 20%. 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 1,000 large facilities (300 factories, 700 buildings) with an annual energy consumption of 1,500 kiloliters crude oil equivalent or more were required to report their GHG emissions annually to the TMG. 4 While emission reductions were voluntary, the reports had to include energy consumption data broken down by month and energy sources. Also, facilities had to hand in a 3-year CO 2 Emissions Management Plan. In a step-by-step process of "Administrative Guidance" the TMG checked the reports and plans, gave advice to the facilities and made them resubmit TMG 2010 TMG , 2011a TMG , 2012a . Major motivations were the transformation of Tokyo into a low carbon city in order to be able to compete internationally with other big cities, but also to show the way to the national government. Due to the big share and the increasing trend of CO 2 emissions from the commercial sector, the TMG ETS focuses on CO 2 emissions from the end-use of energy in large buildings and factories. In total, the program covers around 1,300 facilities (1,000 commercial incl.
public buildings, 300 factories), which consume energy of more than 1,500 kiloliter crude oil equivalent per year. 5 While differentiated emissions factors apply to fuels used in factories, electricity use is treated by one emission factor attributed to the exclusive power supplier, To- However, basically, from this calculation the amount of total emission rights granted to facilities for specified compliance period can be calculated in the following way:
Hence, emission rights are granted free of charge based on a grandfathering approach at the beginning of each compliance period. However, emission rights are not handed out to facilities as certified emission allowances at the beginning of a compliance period, but they are only used for calculating the amount of access credits available to every facility for trading on an annual basis.
Banking of credits is allowed from Period I to Period II, while borrowing is not permitted. Besides credits originating from the TMG ETS itself, three types of offsets can be used to cover emission reduction obligations; all of which have to be verified by external agencies. No credits from national crediting systems are accepted due to their minor quality:
 Emission Reduction Credits from energy savings in small or midsize facilities in Tokyo not covered by the TMG ETS (unlimited)  Renewable Energy Credits from electricity production by solar (heat, electricity), wind, geothermal, hydro (under 1,000 kW), biomass (biomass rate ≥ 95%) etc.; due their positive effects, renewable energy credits are counted 1.5 times the value of regular credits.
 Emission Reductions Credits from outside Tokyo but within Japan; credit sellers must be large facilities with less than 150,000 tons of base year emissions; the company has to be regulated under the TMG ETS; credits are only accepted for one third of facilities' reduction obligations.
New entrants do not fall under the TMG ETS immediately after construction, but only after these facilities have increased their emissions to a level of beyond 1,500 kilolitre crude oil equivalent per year for three executive years. They receive allowances free of charge from a reserve, endowed with a total of 0,74 million allowances. The individual allocation is calculated on the basis of historical emissions over two to three executive years, in which energy saving measures specified by the TMG have to be implemented in order to prevent facilities to increase their emissions by purpose in order to receive more allowances. Facilities are allowed to leave the TMG ETS if one of the following three conditions applies:
 energy consumption of the previous year below 1,000 kilolitre  energy consumption below 1,500 kilolitre for the past 3 consecutive years  shutdown or suspension of operation
The compliance period is then shortened up until the last year prior to when the change occurred, and as allowances are not allocated in advance, they do not have to be given back. 8 Example: Given the above example of base year emissions of 10,000 tons and a compliance factor of 8% as well as annual emissions in the first year of the compliance period of 8,500 tons, no trading is allowed, because actual reductions of 500 t are lower than reduction obligations of 800 t. However, if in year two of the compliance period emissions are 8,000 t, 400 tons worth of credits can be transferred, because reductions (2,000 t.) exceed obligations (1,600 t). The verified reports must be submitted to the TMG. In order to be allowed to trade credits, facil-
ities have to open an account in a registry provided by the TMG at the price of 13,400 Yen. The account contains information on base-year emissions, actual emissions, reduction obligations, and excess credits. In the case of non-compliance or a failure to submit the reports facilities are faced with a financial penalty of up to 500,000 ¥ for breaching the law. In addition, 1.3 times the amount of excess emissions has to be covered by a deadline determined by the Governor. If this regulation is violated, the Governor buys the respective amount of credits from the market and charges the costs to the facilities. Ultimately, the names of the facilities are made public in a "name and shame"-scheme.
9 However, tenants are required to cooperate with building owners, and in the case of large rented floor areas, specified tenants renting rooms with more than 5,000m 2 floor area usage or with an electricity use per year of more than 6 Mio. kWh even have to submit their own emission reduction plans to the TMG via the owner and implement the plans.
In terms of expansion and linking, the TMG follows three strategies: First, the TMG urges the national government to implement its own ETS. The TMG published its own policy proposal, suggesting a national ETS with an absolute volume cap and mandatory participation (TMG 2010: 28ff) . The TMG proposes a two-tier system, in which the national scheme covers big direct emitters of GHG such as utilities and energy-intensive industries, while regional or local systems cover the end-use of energy in office buildings and public facilities. So far, however, the Japanese government seems to be rather reluctant to implement such a kind of scheme soon (Rudolph/Park 2010) . Second, in order to facilitate the bottom-up approach to emissions trading, the TMG intends to expand its system to the neighboring prefectures such as Saitama, Kanagawa, and Chiba. A linkage to the Saitama prefecture, a neighboring prefecture with a similar economic structure, has already been accomplished by accepting Saitama's emission reduction credits in the TMG ETS. Saitama had implemented its own crediting system on a voluntary basis, but apart from the non-bindingness, the program design closely followed TMG rules. The cooperation with Kanagawa and Chiba, however, appears to be more difficult due to differing economic structures. 10 In Kansai, the region including the cities of Osaka, Kyoto, and Kobe, the "Union of Kansai Governments" was founded in 2010, besides others including a regional environment committee aiming at ambitious climate policy measures and considering a local GHG ETS. Kyoto itself is still considering the use of a cap-and-trade scheme and has already come up with its own crediting system. Third, internationally, the TMG supports the im- for fostering a global carbon market. However, due to the focus on the end-use of energy in the TMG ETS, linkages to existing markets in the EU and the US, which have a focus on utilities and energy-intensive industries, seem to be difficult. In addition, even the TMG itself is not eager to implement such a linkage, because it expects an influx of low-price allowances, hampering domestic emission reductions (TMG 2012a).
Evaluation of the TMG ETS and Political Economy Lessons
The TMG ETS is the first urban carbon market in the world focusing on the end-use of energy.
In addition, the TMG ETS is the first mandatory cap-and-trade system in Japan, a country that has only reluctantly relied on market-based instruments in the past (Mochizuki 2011, Ru- dolph/Park 2010). Thus, the TMG ETS has to be considered a pilot project in many ways, whereat naturally still many lessons have to be learned.
Evaluation of the TMG ETS Design
Evaluating the TMG based on the design requirements for sustainable carbon markets (Rudolph et al. 2012) , the following conclusions can be drawn: While the program is mandatory for the targeted sectors without opt-in or opt-out possibilities, it only covers CO 2 emissions from buildings and factories in Tokyo downstream. 11 Thus, it only partly fulfills the sustainability criteria for coverage and bindingness of GHG ETS. The TMG ETS only covers a small share of Tokyo's GHG, making it just partially effective in climate protection. Also, it allows for only taking advantage of limited differences in marginal abatement costs across sectors and gases, hampering its economic efficiency. In addition, it does not treat all emitters equally in making the polluter pay, violating the social justice criteria. However, increasing administrative cost and measurement difficulties may justify less comprehensive coverage even from a theoretical sustainability perspective. Because of these reasons, the TMG ETS consciously focused on CO 2 from large buildings and factories (Nishida/Hua 2011, TMG 2012a). Further more, according to studies commissioned by the TMG, sizable emission reduction potentials mainly exist in Tokyo's buildings, if lighting fixtures are replace, insulation measures are strengthened, and the overall operation of the building is re-examined (Morotomi 2012: 11f) . The bindingness of the program guarantees equal treatment of the covered facilities, also preventing competitive distortions amongst the covered facilities. In addition, it gives incentives to optimize on emission abatement for allowance sellers and suppliers, thus allowing a market with demand and supply to develop. Ultimately, only mandatory participation guarantees the achievement of absolute volume emission reductions, thus not only supporting the protection of the world climate but also the safeguarding of future generations' from heavy burdens from climate change.
The TMG ETS cap is set partly top-down in absolute volume terms, it is expected to create scarcity and produce major emission reduction, and it includes a dynamic reduction, thus fulfilling the sustainability requirements for cap-setting in a GHG ETS. If compared to other emissions trading schemes such as the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (-10%) and the EU ETS (-21%) or even to the EU's or German targets for non-ETS sectors (EU -10%, Germany -14%), the cap appears fairly stringent. As a consequence, the TMG expects allowance prices to increase to up to 100 to 150 US$ per ton in the second trading phase (TMG 2012a), a high level compared to expected US or EU prices. Hence, the TMG ETS is capable of implementing a real ceiling to emissions not endangered by economic growth, thus contributing to climate protection and the safeguarding of future generations, while also reflecting real scarcity into the market.
The reduction of the total amount of emissions in the two phases lowers initial costs of transformation and burdens to current generations while sharpening incentives for efficient emission reductions in the long-run (Meyer 2000) . While the TMG's cap setting includes a bottom-up fragment -facilities can pick the base-year, which in turn might lead to uncertainties in reaching an overall emission reduction (Wakabayashi/Kimura/Nishio 2011) -, the TGM is well-informed about facilities base-year emissions in the relevant period, so that it were capable of estimating the total cap reliably (TMG 2012a). Also, the TMG might tighten the individual sector caps for the second compliance phase, once facilities have picked their base-years, so that at least for the second phase the cap is entirely set top-down.
In terms of the initial allocation, the TMG ETS hands out emission allowances for free, does not create revenues for further use, allows banking while prohibiting borrowing, and accepts ambitious offsets. While the latter two design features comply with sustainability criteria for the initial allocation in GHG ETS, especially the free allocation is problematic. Though the functioning of the market is not seriously hampered, the scarcity price is only created at the secondary market, raising at least short-term uncertainties and delaying investments in innovation; also administrative costs increase. In justice terms, polluters do not have to pay the full costs of using nature's resources and windfall profits may arise, if building owners are able to pass on the opportunity costs to tenants. In addition, there is a good chance of not treating all emitters equally if grandfathering is used, e.g. in the case of early action. Revenues are not generated and thus cannot be used in order to create a Double Dividend (Bovenberg 1999) or support redistributive, climate mitigation, or adaptation measures in order to lower the burden on people most affected by climate change or increasing energy prices (Barnes 2001) . On the other hand, allowing banking and prohibiting borrowing is reasonable, because this combination sets incentives for early reductions and the exploitation of inter-temporal differences in marginal abatement costs, while not endangering the effectiveness of the cap and its safeguarding-value for future generations. The acceptance of high quality offsets such as renewable energy or energy saving offsets on the one hand and the refusal of accepting highly disputed Kyoto and national Japanese credits on the other hand encourage facilities to take advantage of differences in marginal abatement costs between covered and non-covered facilities as well as between domestic facilities and those outside of Tokyo. It may even induce money and technology transfers to less developed facilities without hurting the system's credibility. However accepting offsets increases administrative costs and unlimited acceptance may reduce domestic incentives for emission reductions.
Concerning the trading system, the TMG fixes five year periods with annual reporting, allows any legal entity to engage in the market, but only makes case-by-case credited excess allowances tradable; so far, it relies on bilateral trading and even considers market interventions in the case of a price surge; hence, the TMG ETS only partly fulfills sustainability criteria for the trading system in a GHG ETS. A five year trading period allows enough flexibility for facilities to optimize on their emission situation inter-temporally, thus fostering efficiency gains (Wakabayashi/Kimura/Nishio 2011). Annual reporting of emissions enables the TMG to keep control of the emission developments and target achievements in reasonable time horizons, protecting the total emission limit and the safeguarding-value for future generations. However, although the market is equally accessible to everybody, the actual trading of allowances and thus the achievement of efficiency improvements might be hampered by the restrictions on trade, the crediting process, and the lack of an institutionalized market (Wakabayashi/Kimura/Nishio 2011). In order to cope with these problems and lower transaction costs, the TMG offers help in matching supply and demand and has even registered five intermediaries for brokering transactions (TMG 2012a). Still, transaction costs are expected to be high, especially for small and mid-size emitters. They may add up to 2,500 ¥ per ton of CO 2 reductions for the smallest emitters, a number significantly above the levels for CDM credits (1,500-2,000 ¥) (Wakabayashi/Kimura/Nishio 2011). The probability of market interventions such as a safety valve creates uncertainty and may interfere with the price signal as well as the optimal allocation of reduction measures (Wakabayashi/Kimura/Nishio 2011); also, they might loosen the ecological stringency, thus even reducing the safeguarding-value of the cap for future generations.
Monitoring, Reporting, and Verification (MRV) follow stringent and reliable procedures combining measuring and calculating as well as external verification. Penalties are set at a level above expected allowance prices also including the ex post compensation of excess emissions.
Thus, the monitoring system fulfills the requirements for sustainable MRV in GHG ETS. Reliable MRV guarantee compliance with regulations, leading to real emission reductions, efficiency gains, and the protection of future generations as well as making the polluter pay. Penalties above the allowance price including ex post compensation prevent the fine to be considered a quasi price and a cheap way of compliance. They also act as a punishment for breaching the law and an ex ante discouragement of non-compliance, thus protecting the cap and making the polluter pay.
Evaluation of Initial Results and Political Economy Lessons from the TMG ETS
After evaluating the design and giving some estimation of effects to be expected, this section analyzes actual data on the performance of the TMG ETS. In terms of ecological effectiveness:
the most recent emissions data available dates from the year 2009, the last year prior to the start of the TMG ETS but two years after the announcement of the TMG ETS (TMG 2011b (TMG , 2012b .
This data indicates that the cap for the first trading phase 2010-2014 was comparably loose. Table 2 shows the actual emission amounts in the base-year and 2009 as well as the change between the base-year and 2009 Source: data based on TMG 2011b, 2012b
In total, emission reductions of the participants (-10%) were far bigger then the intended reduction for the first phase (-6%). While factories achieved reductions of more than 5.2 times their target (6%), commercial buildings exactly complied with their goal (8%). Of the 1,173 reporting facilities, 697 facilities (59%) achieved reductions beyond their actual targets, while 476 (41%)
were not in compliance. 260 facilities (22%) even achieved reductions of more than 17%, which is the reduction target for the second compliance phase (2015) (2016) (2017) (2018) (2019) . These reductions can be partly attributed to the suffering of Tokyo's businesses from the global economic crisis. Still, major reductions were induced by the announcement effect of the TMG ETS. However, still, of the ex ante set sector caps, only the cap for commercial buildings was binding, while the factory cap was not. Having achieved reductions of 10% in total already, the TMG ETS reduction target of 6% in the first period and its corresponding cap is not expected to be binding even if there is some recovery from the global economic crisis. This is particularly true, because the energy rationing measures in Tokyo after the Fukushima nuclear accident might even lead to more emission savings from 2011 onwards, especially if the emission factors will remain unchanged even though fossil fuel use in power production has significantly increased after Fukushima.
Thus, under the given circumstances, which admittedly could not be foreseen by the TMG at the time of sector target setting in March 2008, the cap for the first phase appears to be relatively lax. The target of a 17% reduction by 2020 for the second trading phase at first sight seems to be more stringent, because major economic disturbances might be at least partly overcome by then. However, already in 2009, 22% of the covered facilities achieved even the overall reduction for the second phase, which can be taken as a first indication that even the cap for the second phase is not too tight. Altogether, taking early data into account, while the TMG ETS appears to be able to achieve its pre-set targets accurately, additional reductions seem to be possible by strengthening the cap. Also, if the cap is non-binding for some sectors, innovation incentives are not as strong as they could be.
In terms of economic efficiency, data on the issuance of credits and trading is available from facilities (17%) had opened an account, which would allow them to apply for tradable credits and (TMG 2012a). Altogether, in terms of actual trading volume and price signals, the TMG ETS has so far not been able to establish a full-fledged market, which would facilitate costefficient emission reductions and incentives to innovate. There is some hope that trading volumes might increase at the end of the first compliance period, but even at that point of time the lack of scarcity and the banking option might limit the trading volume (Wakabayashi/Kimura/Nishio 2011). So far, data on transaction and administrative costs is no available, but due to grandfathering and case-by-case approval of credits as well as the lack of an institutionalize trading platform these costs can be expected to be high.
Apart from economic, ecological, and social effects of the TMG ETS, the decision making process also provides important lessons. While generally political economy theory predicts that 
Conclusions
Megacities such as Tokyo already play a major role in climate protection and will increase their importance in the future. Hence, the Tokyo Metropolitan Government Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Scheme (TMG ETS) can be considered an important step forward in terms of not only using market-based climate policy instruments in Japan, but also in terms of paving the way for applying the instrument of emissions trading to reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions at the end-use level in big cities. The current design of the TMG ETS already fulfills a good share of sustainability criteria for GHG ETS (Table 3) . Naturally, as the TMG ETS represents a global pilot project, there is room for improvements. In order to fully take advantage of ETS's ability to foster climate protection in an economically efficient, ecologically effective, and socially just way, the TMG ETS could be enhanced by  extending the scope to other sectors and gases  tightening the cap  phasing-in auctions for emission allowances  allowing trading of all allowances and institutionalizing an allowance market Extending the scope would allow a more comprehensive coverage and emission limitation, greater potentials for efficiency gains, and a fairer distribution of reduction responsibilities.
Tightening the cap would make a bigger contribution to climate protection, the safeguarding of future generations, and innovation incentives. Auctioning would send early price signals, make the polluter pay, and allow for the revenues to be used for re-distributional or climate mitigation and adaptation measures as well as a Double Dividend. Fostering the trading of allowances has the potential of greater efficiency gains. (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) (2015) (2016) (2017) (2018) (2019) ; annual monitoring bilateral trading of excess credits possible if price surge Monitoring and Penalties MRV penalties IT-based, continuous, reliable >allowance price + compensation externally verified facility reports and registries penalty up to 500,000 ¥; 1.3 times compensation, "name and shame" 12 E.g. as proposed in the Budget Approach (WBGU 2009) and the Contraction & Convergence Proposal (Meyer 2000) .
13 E.g. as proposed in the Contraction & Convergence Proposal (Meyer 2000) .
14 E.g. as proposed in the Sky Trust Model (Barnes 2001) .
In order to spread the use of local GHG ETS to other large cities, the following (political) success factors can be derived from the TMG ETS (Nishida/Hua 2011: 524ff):
 availability of data via ex ante mandatory comprehensive reporting 15  cooperation between pro-active forces in the government and the civil society  strong and well-informed leadership by the local government  publicly held, transparent stakeholder meetings  appropriate design taking into account local circumstances Altogether, even if political barriers for introducing national or even supranational ETS will be overcome in the future, megacity schemes should be a supplementary method of reducing GHG especially from the commercial sector and at the end-use level. For such a purpose, despite of some design flaws, the TMG ETS is a worthwhile model, which should be seriously considered by other major cities in the world in order to foster a sustainable bottom-up approach to global climate protection. 
